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MAKING SENSE OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION: METAPHOR AND 
DISCIPLINED IMAGINATION  
This article draws upon Karl Weicks insights into the nature of theorizing, and 
extends and refines his conception of theory construction as disciplined imagination. 
An essential ingredient in Weicks disciplined imagination involves his assertion 
that thought trials and theoretical representations typically involve a transfer from one 
epistemic sphere to another through the creative use of metaphor. The article follows 
up on this point and draws out how metaphor works, how processes of metaphorical 
imagination partake in theory construction, and how insightful metaphors and the 
theoretical representations that result from them can be selected. The paper also 
includes a discussion of metaphors-in-use (organizational improvisation as jazz and 
organizational behavior as collective mind) which Weick proposed in his own 
writings. The whole purpose of this exercise is to theoretically augment and ground 
the concept of disciplined imagination, and in particular to refine the nature of 
thought trials and selection within it. In doing so, we also aim to provide pointers for 
the use of metaphorical imagination in the process of theory construction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Through his many writings on theory construction and theorizing (e.g., Weick 1989, 
1995a, 1999), Karl Weick has sketched an account of organizational theorizing as an 
ongoing and evolutionary process where researchers themselves actively construct 
representations - representations that form approximations of the target subject under 
consideration and that subsequently provide the groundwork for extended theorizing 
(i.e. construct specification, development of hypotheses) and research. The most 
detailed account of this process is provided in his awarded 1989 article on theory 
construction as disciplined imagination (Weick 1989), wherein theory construction is 
likened to artificial selection as theorists are both the source of variation and the 
source of selection when they construct and select theoretical representations of a 
certain target subject (Weick 1989: 520). Furthermore, in constructing theory, Weick 
suggested, theorists and researchers design, conduct and interpret imaginary 
experiments where they rely upon metaphors to provide them with vocabularies and 
images to represent and express organizational phenomena that are often complex and 
abstract. The various metaphorical images simulated through such imaginary 
experiments, then, are further selected through the application of specific selection 
criteria and possibly retained for further theorizing and research. As such, theory 
construction resembles the three processes of evolution: variation, selection and 
retention (Weick 1989). 
 At the heart of disciplined imagination lies the role played by metaphor as 
the vehicle through which imagination takes place and as the source - as a simulated 
image - for theoretical representations that as mentioned may come to be selected and 
retained for extended theorizing and research. Here, Weick (1989) joins ranks with  a 
long line of commentaries in organization studies (e.g. Cornelissen 2004; Morgan 
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1980, 1983; Tsoukas 1991) and beyond (e.g. Danziger 1990) that have emphasized 
the use of metaphor, as a cognitive and heuristic device, in schematizing theoretical 
perspectives, in inviting academic researchers to view and understand phenomena in a 
new light and to recognize conceptual distinctions that were inconceivable before, and 
in providing the groundwork and models for extended organizational theorizing 
(construct specification, formulation of hypotheses etc.) and research.  
 Although Weicks (1989) discussion of disciplined imagination effectively 
placed metaphor at the core of theory construction, he did not further elaborate on 
how is it that metaphors actually work, nor did he mention what kind of heuristics 
organizational researchers may use to produce and select useful metaphorical images 
of organizational subjects. In fact, the organizational literature as a whole has paid 
little attention to questions concerning how metaphors work and how effective 
metaphors are developed and selected, whilst showing a general agreement with 
Weick (1989) on the fundamental and constitutive nature of metaphor in 
organizational theorizing (e.g. Cornelissen 2004; Grant and Oswick 1996; Putnam et 
al. 1996; Putnam and Boys 2006). Because of this neglect in the literature, we aim to 
augment Weicks conception of disciplined imagination by clarifying how 
metaphors are used in organizational theorizing and how rich and meaningful 
metaphors can be imagined. This discussion is illustrated with different metaphors-in-
use within organization studies, including the organizational improvisation as jazz 
and collective mind metaphors which Weick himself has worked with and promoted 
through his own writings. We then use the insights from this exercise to refine the 
process of disciplined imagination, particularly in terms of specifying the particulars 
of metaphorical imagination and of imagining effective metaphorical images, and in 
turn provide clear pointers for the use of metaphorical imagination in the process of 
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theory construction.  
 In what follows, we will first provide a synopsis of the concept of disciplined 
imagination and its contribution to the subject of organizational theorizing. Here, we 
will also consider the evolutionary epistemology associated with disciplined 
imagination and what this suggests for metaphorical imagination and the body of 
knowledge in organization theory. We then move on to a more specific and detailed 
discussion of the way in which metaphors work and contribute to theoretical 
representations using insights from cognitive linguistic research on metaphor as well 
as selected case studies of metaphors-in-use (organizational improvisation as jazz 
and organizational behavior as collective mind) within organization studies. 
Following on from this discussion, we also explore the heuristics that play a part in 
the development and selection of effective metaphors in organizational theory. We 
then integrate the insights from this exploration within the existing framework of 
disciplined imagination to provide a theoretically augmented and more robust 
account of the process of theory construction. We conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of our extension to disciplined imagination for theory construction 
within organization studies.  
 
‘DISCIPLINED IMAGINATION’: PROCESSES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Prior to Weicks article in 1989, many commentaries had considered the process of 
theory construction as a mechanistic and linear process of moving from problem 
statements to constructs and testable propositions. As Weick noted, because of this 
characterization, most descriptions considered theory construction as a linear process 
of problem solving, and showed a concomitant concern with outcomes and products 
rather than process (Weick, 1989: 517). Weick (1989) suggested instead to view 
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theory construction as a process of disciplined imagination, and in doing so 
introduced a shift in focus from the rule-based generation of theory, which may have 
been the dominant view in the past (e.g., Daft and Lewin 1990; Pinder and Bourgeois 
1982), to the topology of metaphors, to creative variation in imagination, and to the 
projection from one domain to another of conceptual organization (Weick 1989).  
 Disciplined imagination poses an evolutionary process of theory 
construction that is characterized by simultaneous rather than sequential thinking and 
revolves around three components: problem statements, thought trials, and selection 
criteria. These components represent reference points in the process where 
researchers can act differently and produce theories of better quality. As Weick 
(1989: 529) remarks; theory construction can be modified at the step where the 
problem is stated (make assumptions more explicit, make representation more 
accurate, make representation more detailed), at the step where thought trials are 
formulated (increase number of trials generated, increase heterogeneity of trials 
generated), and at the step where criteria select among thought trials (apply criteria 
more consistently, apply more criteria simultaneously, apply more diverse criteria).  
 Four characteristics of disciplined imagination are important to fully 
understand and appreciate this particular perspective upon theory construction. A first 
characteristic is that disciplined imagination assumes an active role for researchers 
who construe theoretical representations, rather than seeing such theoretical 
representations as deductively or naturally following from problem statements. In 
other words, disciplined imagination is rooted in the view that the logic of 
scientific discovery, including the process of theory construction, is psychological, 
that is, a matter of heuristics - and not just logical, that is, composed of deduction and 
predictions (see also Simon 1973). Weick (1989: 519) remarks to this effect that 
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theorizing is typically more like artificial selection than natural selection as the 
theorist rather than nature intentionally guides the evolutionary process [of selecting 
theoretical representations].  
A second characteristic of disciplined imagination is that it suggests that 
metaphorical imagination is the central epistemic logic that is used to develop and 
select theoretical representations in relation to a target subject or problem (see also 
Morgan 1980). Here, researchers are seen to engage in a number of mental 
experiments or thought trials where they iterate between reviewed literature, 
preliminary analyses, background assumptions and their own intuition to consider a 
rich cascade of metaphorical images as representations of the subject or problem in 
hand (imagination) before selecting and deciding upon one metaphorical image that 
serves as a starting point for a further inquiry into it (discipline). Metaphorical 
imagination thus typically includes a combination of both deductive reasoning, based 
upon a reading of the available literature on the topic, and inductive reasoning 
through intuitive thinking, rather than a focus on either one (Weick 1989). In Weicks 
(1989: 529) own words; theorists depend on pictures, maps, and metaphors to grasp 
the object of study, and have no choice [in this], but can be more deliberate in the 
formation of these images and more respectful of representations and efforts to 
improve them.  
A third characteristic of disciplined imagination is that it emphasizes that the 
representations that result from the heterogeneous variation of (metaphorical) images 
in relation to a target subject or problem can only be selected and assessed on the 
basis of judgments of plausibility (rather than validity) and their subsequent currency 
for extended theorizing and research. That is, (metaphorical) imagination leads to 
simulated images which cannot themselves be directly falsified but can however be 
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elaborated on to form more full-scale representations of a subject or problem. Here, 
Weick (1989) anticipates the important difference between metaphorical images that 
exist in a pre-conceptual, non-propositional form and the theoretical models, 
constructs and propositions that are derived from them and that figure in extended 
theorizing and research. Metaphorical images are embodied imaginative structures of 
human understanding that give coherent, meaningful structure to our experience at a 
pre-conceptual level (see also Johnson 1987), although indeed, within our theorizing 
endeavors, we often proceed with discussing them in the abstract and reducing and 
explicating them in propositional terms (see also Folger and Turillo 1999; Morgan 
1980, 1996).  
The fourth characteristic concerns the evolutionary epistemology that 
underlies much of Weicks work (e.g. Weick 2004) including the notion of 
disciplined imagination. In disciplined imagination, this evolutionary perspective 
suggests first of all that theory construction involves a process of variation, selection 
and retention of theoretical representations. Moreover, it suggests that better 
theorizing results from multiple and heterogeneous variations of representations to 
arrive at the one(s) with survival value. In this sense, disciplined imagination is 
reminiscent of Koestlers (1964) well-known comments on the development of new 
conceptual insights. Koestler (1964: 264) likened this to the process of biological 
evolution claiming that new ideas are thrown up spontaneously like mutations; the 
vast majority of them are useless, the equivalent of biological freaks without survival 
value. The creative process, accordingly, is seen as something like a series of trial-
and-error tests of the various metaphoric combinations of concepts possible.  
 
Focusing on the evolutionary epistemology of ‘disciplined imagination’ 
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 It is worth mentioning in relation to this last point that in subsequent writings, 
Weicks evolutionary perspective of theory construction has shifted somewhat. In his 
1989 article, Weick assumed that a variation of multiple and different metaphorical 
images normally provides for a sufficiently rich ground for arriving at a plausible 
representation of a certain target subject or problem. In his writings since, Weick has 
stretched the evolutionary logic further by suggesting that the creation of new 
insights and conceptual advances is important for the continuous development of 
organization theory; and that as such researchers should be striving to break new 
ground in the metaphorical correlation of concepts (Weick 1993, 1998, 1999a). 
According to Weick, conceptual advances come about when instead of scouting out 
old ground for neglected gems, we cover new grounds by examining empirical 
contexts previously overlooked but potentially illuminating of large-scale human 
organizations (Weick 1993, 1999a) and by conceptually associating ideas that were 
not previously related, let alone associated with one another (Weick 1998, 1999a). 
The implication that follows from this last point is twofold; first, researchers need to 
creatively search for new, possibly foreign concepts to compare metaphorically with 
the target concept of organization in order to probe and possibly advance organization 
theory further. Second, disciplined imagination is seen as part of an ongoing process 
of theorizing. Weick, in his own words, prefers theorizing to theory (Weick 1995a, 
2004). He prefers an ongoing and creative process of metaphorical imagination and 
theoretical conjectures over a teleological view of theory as fixed reference points (or 
truths) to attain (Weick 1995a, 2004). 
 
METAPHOR, SEMANTIC LEAPS AND ‘DISCIPLINED IMAGINATION’ 
Throughout his writings, Weick (1989) recognizes the creative component to 
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associative thought and to the creation of metaphor. Ideas or concepts are capable of 
entering into relations with an unlimited variety of other ideas or concepts (Anderson 
1976: 147), rather than a limited set of predefined categories. In Weicks words, 
scholars pull from different vocabularies (Weick 1995b: 107) in the creation of 
metaphors and through the use of such metaphors supply language with flexibility, 
expressibility and a way to expand the language (Weick, 1979: 47). As such, there is 
a certain dynamism and fluidity to metaphors, with words and concepts existing in a 
continuous, analog fashion in our semantic memory (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1993) 
that, when connected to another concept, can be brought to bear upon a different 
realm of our experience. The theatre concept, for instance, has been metaphorically 
connected to concepts as diverse as identity formation within social psychology 
(e.g. Goffman 1959), human consciousness within the cognitive and brain sciences 
(e.g. Baars 1997), and rituals and behavior within organization theory (e.g. 
Mangham and Overington 1987). What this suggests is not only that our semantic 
memory allows us to connect up a vast range of different experiences that manifest 
the same recurring structure, but also that concepts themselves are semantically not 
rigid or fixed (and strictly ordered in hierarchical relationships or categories), but can 
in a more fluid sense be applied and connected to other concepts in and through the 
use of metaphors (see also MacCormac 1986).  
 Weick emphasized this point in his early writings; both in the 1979 edition of 
the Social Psychology of Organizing (Weick, 1979) and in his 1983 and 1984 articles 
written in collaboration with Richard Daft (Daft and Weick 1984; Weick and Daft 
1983) he emphasizes that metaphorical imagination is creative (beyond existing 
realms of knowledge within organization theory) but assumes certain presuppositions 
about what an organization is perceived to be. As Weick and Daft (1983: 72), for 
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example, suggest, organizations are vast, fragmented, elusive, and 
multidimensional, which requires the investigator to make a presupposition as to the 
basic nature of organization. To adopt a perspective (however limited or faulty it may 
eventually turn out to be) means seeing through a lens, and primarily a metaphorical 
one. Are organizations, they ask rhetorically, input-output systems, resource 
allocation systems, collections of humans with needs to be met, growth and survival 
systems, tools in the hands of goal-setters, coalitions of interest groups, 
transformation systems (Weick and Daft 1983: 172), or what? Given that an 
organization is patently not an object in the usual sense of something to be physically 
apprehended by the senses, such metaphorical images and related presuppositions 
about an organization are necessary (Weick 1979: 47). At the same time, as Weicks 
(1979) criticism of the military metaphor of organization highlights, he is in favour of 
certain metaphors over others given their potential for theorizing and their impact 
upon managerial practice.  
Summarizing Weicks views on metaphor across these writings, it appears 
very strongly that he considers metaphor not only as quintessential to theory 
construction but also as demonstrating the productive character of meaning 
construction. In this sense, Weick anticipates that rather than just retrieving and 
instantiating frames or lexicalized relationships between concepts or terms, 
metaphorical language sets up a creative and often novel correlation of two concepts 
or ideas which forces us to make semantic leaps to create an understanding of the 
information that comes off it (Coulson 2001). Taking this point even one step further, 
it appears that Weick (1989) favours a view of the creative, unexpected and on-line 
development of metaphorical language over a view that assumes conventionalized 
and fixed patterns of metaphorical thinking about organizations. The latter view is 
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characteristic of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) (Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980) which suggests that patterns in everyday linguistic expressions suggest 
the existence of a system of conventional conceptual metaphors, such as love is a 
journey, argument is war, and so on. Such patterns may indeed exist within 
organization theory; for example in our use of the now conventional metaphorical 
images of organizations as machines, open-systems or organisms (Baum and Rowley 
2002).  
However, CMT cannot account for all metaphors of organization that may 
potentially emerge and effectively denies the possibility favored by Weick that new 
metaphors are imagined, selected and possibly retained. A further difficulty involves 
the directionality that CMT assumes with the source concept acting as a lens for the 
target - evidence from empirical research rather suggests that metaphor 
comprehension involves more than a set of directional mappings from a source to a 
target domain (e.g. Coulson 2001). Instead of assuming that a discrete metaphorical 
structure exists (Gibbs 1996) metaphorical meaning arises out of the active 
combination and blending of information from both the target and source concepts. 
Tourangeau and Rips (1991), for example, have found that many of the features listed 
for metaphoric meanings were emergent, they were not established parts of either of 
the concepts conjoined in the metaphor. They suggested that this pattern of data 
argues against CMT.  
An alternative branch of theory, conceptual blending (CB) (Fauconnier and 
Turner 1998, 2002), accommodates these difficulties and assumes with Tourangeau 
and Rips (1991) that metaphor comprehension requires the transformation rather than 
transfer of properties from one concept to another. CB suggests that the metaphorical 
correlation of concepts sets up a number of blending processes in which the 
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imaginative capacities of meaning construction are evoked to produce emergent 
meaning. The strengths of CB theory are that it provides an account of how 
metaphorical meanings are actively constructed within Weicks disciplined 
imagination. In addition, CB theory suggests that the products of metaphorical 
mappings are more influential when they adhere to a set of specific principles known 
as the optimality principles; a set of constraints under which metaphors are most 
effective. Fauconnier and Turner (1998) argue for six such optimality principles. In 
addition, we suggest and illustrate two further optimality principles which on the 
basis of evidence from research on metaphors within organization studies are also 
relevant (see Cornelissen 2004, 2005). The following section outlines the role of 
metaphorical imagination within the process of disciplined imagination and 
discusses the impact of these optimality principles on the development, selection and 
retention of metaphors and the theoretical representations that stem from them.  
 
IMAGINING APT AND MEANINGFUL METAPHORS  
Weick (1989) noted that organizational researchers, like scientists in other social 
scientific fields, not only direct themselves the metaphorical imagination process but 
also subsequently select the theoretical representation(s) for the target subject under 
consideration. In one sense, this artificial selection process, to paraphrase Weick 
(1989), is reflected in the huge variety of ways in which the subject of organization 
itself has been thought of and represented. Here, we discuss two metaphors, 
organizational improvisation as jazz and organizational behavior as collective 
mind which Weick himself has imagined, selected and advanced in his writings.  
 
Example 1: Organizational Improvisation as Jazz 
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CB theory suggests that the metaphorical correlation of concepts sets up a 
number of blending processes in which the imaginative capacities of meaning 
construction are evoked to produce emergent meaning. Such emergent meaning arises 
out of the operation of three blending processes: composition, completion and 
elaboration (see also Cornelissen 2004, 2005). Composition involves attributing a 
relation from one concept to an element or elements from the other input concept. 
Within metaphors, this means that a frame for a source concept such as jazz has 
been mapped onto an abstract target concept as improvisation within organizations. 
Such compositional mappings are normally guided by perceived relationships of 
identity, similarity or analogy between the target and source concepts, where these 
perceived commonalities provide the semantic rationale for the metaphorical 
correlation of the concepts involved (Oakley 1998). In this first example, the 
composition of jazz and organizational improvisation was based on the minimal 
structure and related degrees of improvisation (i.e. a continuum that ranges from 
interpretation via embellishment and variation to improvisation) that was seen to be 
integral to both jazz and improvisational work processes within organizations 
(Weick 1998). Completion is pattern completion that occurs when structure in the 
composition matches information in long-term memory. Because we complete the 
jazz frame for organization with the inference that organizing or managing is itself an 
exercise in improvisation (e.g. Kamoche et al. 2003; Weick 1998), the composition is 
completed with information about jazz, including the use of musical structures (a 
song that is known, a melody or tune adhered to, music theory which functions as 
grammar or cognitive rules for generating, selecting and building upon new music 
ideas) and of minimal social practice structures (behavioral norms regulating soloist 
role transitions in the collective, verbal and nonverbal communicative codes) (Bastien 
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and Hostager 1988; Kamoche et al. 2003) that guide improvisational processes and 
actions. In the integration of jazz and organizational improvisation, the 
metaphorical composition is thus completed with information about jazz and 
organizational improvisation, and the inference that organizational improvisation is 
performative in nature, guided by technical structures and minimal social structures 
and involving simultaneous reflection and action, simultaneous rule creation and 
following, continuous mixing of the expected with the novel, and the feature of a 
heavy reliance on intuitive grasp and imagination (e.g. Bastien and Hostager 1988; 
Kamoche et al. 2003). Completion is closely related to elaboration, a process that 
involves imaginative mental simulation or running of the event in the composition 
made according to its emergent properties and logic. The jazz improvisation blend, 
for example, is elaborated with a mental image of members of the organization 
composing and performing their (inter)actions deliberately, collaboratively, 
simultaneously, temporarily and in real-time, while guided by minimal social 
structures and their collective memories. Elaboration of the blend leads to an 
emergent meaning that as mentioned is non-compositional - information from the 
target (organizational improvisation) and source (jazz) concepts is not only 
collapsed into one composition, and transformed and completed, but also elaborated 
on in a mental or imaginary sense so that a new, emergent meaning is established. 
Writers as Weick (1998: 549) and Kamoche and Cunha (2001) illustrate this when 
they talk of organizational improvisation as involving a conversation between an 
emerging pattern in performing and such things as formal features of the underlying 
composition, previous interpretations, the actors own logic, responsiveness of the 
organizational culture, procedures and systems, and the expectations and roles of the 
other actors and stakeholders involved. 
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Example 2: Organizational Behavior as Collective Mind 
In this second example, the behavior of individuals within an organization is 
likened to neural processes and operations in the brain. The metaphor employs the 
language of neural tissues, and their associated physiological processes, to describe 
and explain collective behavior within an organization. The composition between 
organizational behavior and mind, then, follows from a constructed resemblance 
between the view of mind as a vibrating network of synchronous associations rather 
than a linear tract of stimulus-storage-reproduction (Draaisma 2000: 161) and of 
organizational behavior as equally involving patterns of interrelated actions in an 
organizational setting (Weick and Roberts 1993). The composition of organizational 
behavior as collective mind is subsequently completed with the inference that 
thinking or intelligence, as in the case of a mind, is an emergent effect produced by 
the spontaneous, self-organized functioning of a complex network of neural activities 
(Dupuy 2000). The term used by cognitive psychologists to capture this process is 
intentionality, i.e. cognition as understood through this metaphor is said to be 
intentional.  At the organizational level of analysis, theorists seeking to develop 
accounts of the organizational mind or collective mind (e.g. Sandelands and 
Stablein 1987; Weick and Roberts 1993) have similarly argued that the thinking 
capacity of organizations, or intelligence, is an emergent effect, manifested through 
the actions of distributed networks of individuals (akin to neural agents) which are 
systematically interrelated in the form of detectible, emergent patterns. These 
patterns, then, have through metaphorical completion come to be seen as intelligent, 
heedful or intentional (Weick and Roberts 1993). The subsequent elaboration of 
the metaphor results in a view of organizational mind or collective mind not just as 
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an emergent effect, but imagines an organization as a connectionist system that is able 
to produce thinking or intelligence, this being an emergent property of the system as 
a whole. The implication of this emergent metaphorical meaning is that organizational 
behavior and thinking cannot be localized at some lower level of analysis such as the 
level of individual actors or elemental subgroups (Weick and Roberts 1993).   
Both these metaphors have created new images and theoretical representations 
of organizations, and have been referred to, discussed and examined in writings in the 
field (see, for example, Kamoche and Cunha 2001; Kamoche, Cunha and Cunha 
2003; Orlikowski 2002; Tsoukas 1996). Both metaphors are good examples of how 
metaphors lead to emergent meaning (and cannot therefore be reduced to the 
meanings of its component parts), and as such have enriched the conceptualization 
(and subsequent understanding) of organizational improvisation and organizational 
behavior and have generated novel inferences and conjectures, in line with Weicks 
view of disciplined imagination. Both these metaphors were also found to be apt 
and fitting to the target subjects that they are meant to illuminate, not just in the eyes 
of Weick (1998; Weick and Roberts 1993) who was central to their selection and 
introduction into the field, but also in the view of other writers who have since 
referred to these metaphors. We argue that this is primarily the result of these two 
metaphors adhering to a set of specific principles known as the optimality 
principles; a set of constraints under which metaphorical blends are most effective. 
As a whole, the eight optimality principles are the following, with the first six the 
original ones proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002; see also Coulson 
2001; Coulson and Oakley 2000): the integration, topology, web, unpacking, good 
reason, metonymic tightening, distance and concreteness principles. 
 Despite their poetic names, most of these principles are derived from standard 
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pressures that obtain in all mapping situations including metaphorical mappings (see 
Hofstadter 1995, for a review). The organizational improvisation as jazz metaphor 
satisfies most of these principles including the integration, topology, web, unpacking, 
good reason, metonymic tightening and concreteness principles. The organizational 
behavior as collective mind equally satisfies a multitude of principles including the 
integration, topology, web, unpacking, good reason, metonymic tightening and 
distance principles (Table 1).  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 around here 
------------------------------- 
 
The integration principle, first of all, refers to the pressure to bring partial 
structure from different concepts and domains together in such a way that it produces 
a fully integrated metaphorical image with an easily manipulable representation 
(Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 2002). In research on metaphorical mappings, the 
integration principle is embodied in the observation that metaphors are more apt and 
fitting when they relate target and source concepts that are more exact or 
representative of one another (e.g. Katz 1992). The organizational improvisation as 
jazz metaphor discussed above provides a good example of the application of the 
integration principle; terminology and structure from the domain of jazz (e.g. the 
use of technical structures and minimal social structures) is seen as representative of 
improvisational work processes within organizations and has, once integrated, led to a 
compact, easily understood and manipulable scene of the nature and process of 
organizational improvisation.  
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The topology principle exerts normative pressure to construct and maintain 
metaphorical mappings in such a way as to preserve relational structure (Coulson and 
Oakley 2000; Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 2002). In research on metaphorical 
mappings, Gentner and Clement (1988) have found that relational metaphors (i.e. 
those whose interpretation is based on relational properties) are judged more apt than 
attributive metaphors (i.e. those metaphors whose interpretation is based on non-
relational properties, namely common object attributes, and are therefore mere-
appearance matches) (see also Tsoukas 1993 for this point). The organizational 
behavior as collective mind is a good example of this principle; the metaphor relates 
the domains of (interrelated) behaviors of individuals in organizations and neural 
processes in the mind that share a common relational structure of (human and 
neural) agents with an activity (behavior in relation to others and a neuron firing 
away if the existence or absence of an impulse in the afferent synapses excites it) and 
an emergent outcome or effect (a network of behavioral activities and a neural 
activity pattern). Clearly, a relational connection is expressed within this metaphor, 
which, according to Gentner and Clements (1988) notation, involves a relation 
between entities in the relevant domain: agents, their activity, and the environments 
that they act upon.  
The web principle suggests that the representation in the metaphorical blend 
should maintain its mappings to the input concepts. Satisfaction of the web principle 
is what allows one to access elements in the blend with names and descriptions from 
the input concepts, as well as what allows the projection of structure from the blend to 
other applications and subjects, including the input target and source concepts. Within 
both the organizational improvisation as jazz and collective mind metaphors, the 
source domains of these metaphors are clearly understood and have provided access 
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to a vocabulary (musical structures, soloing, intentionality, etc.) for conceptualizing 
the target subjects of improvisation and behavior within organizations. 
The unpacking principle, the dictate that given a metaphorical blend, the 
comprehender should be able to construct structure in relation to other subjects and 
applications, can be thought of as pressure to use conventional mapping schemas that 
facilitate comprehension. Thus construed, the unpacking principle applies pressure to 
use common and well-known conceptual metaphors, such as the link between seeing 
and knowing (e.g., managerial scanning), organizational development and evolution 
(e.g., population ecology), or between organizational performances and theatre (e.g., 
organizational theatre). Our two examples of jazz and mind are equally 
sufficiently known and understood as general concepts or domains. As such, they are 
easily correlated to subjects within organization theory and can also be unpacked in 
relation to other target subjects besides organizational improvisation and 
organizational behavior (as evidenced by, for example, Garud and Kothas (1994) 
application of the mind metaphor to model flexible production systems).  
The good reason principle refers to the pressure to consider the elements 
composed and elaborated upon in the metaphoric blend as significant, even if an 
element is seemingly incidental or complicit. For example, in the case of the 
collective mind metaphor, the significant element of emergence in neural activity 
in the brain was seen as connected and was thus elaborated on in the context of (inter-
related) behaviors between members of an organization.  
The metonymic tightening principle builds from the observation that many 
representations in metaphoric blends are interpretable because of metonymic 
relationships between elements in the blend and elements in the inputs. This was also 
observed by Morgan (1996: 231), who commented that a metaphorical image relies 
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on some kind of metonymical reduction, otherwise it remains thin air. For example, 
the metaphorical blend of organizational improvisation as jazz is interpretable 
because of conventional metonymic mappings between managers and their 
organization, as well as conventional metaphoric mappings between organizations 
and jazz. In the metaphorical blend, then, the relationship between managers and 
organizations has been compressed such that they are understood as being one and 
the same. In other words, the use of organizational involves tightening or 
compression in which a small group of senior managers stands in for absent workers 
in such a way that they become one intentional organizational group (see also Taylor 
and Cooren 1997 for this point).  
The distance principle is rooted in findings from empirical research which 
clearly suggest that for a metaphor to be apt and effective, the conjoined target and 
source concepts need to come from distant domains in our semantic memory. 
Cornelissen (2004, 2005) conceptualized this pressure as the search for between-
domains distance, which must be fairly large for the metaphor to be effective because 
close distances provide little interaction or surprise. The organizational 
improvisation as jazz metaphor, then, although embodying a degree of distance 
between what we normally understand with improvisation in organizations on the one 
hand and jazz improvisation within musical performances on the other, is as a 
collective human activity however not as distant from organization as such concepts 
and domains as, for example, chaos or ecology. As such, this metaphor has not 
fully satisfied the distance principle. 
The concreteness principle, finally, refers to pressure to select concrete rather 
than abstract source concepts for metaphorical blending with a target concept. Katz 
(1989, 1992) produced empirical evidence suggesting that the aptness and 
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effectiveness of a metaphor is higher when a concrete, rather than abstract, source 
concept is metaphorically compared to the target. The rather widespread metaphorical 
image of organization as a kind of machine illustrates this principle well. The 
machine metaphor suggests an integrated picture of organization as comprised of a 
series of mechanically structured interconnected parts; and is based upon a rather 
specific and concrete conception of machines (e.g. Morgan 1996; Tsoukas 1993). 
The organizational behavior as collective mind metaphor to an extent violates the 
concreteness principle as it is rather abstract and not clearly evident what kind of 
concrete neuron-like relationships from the notion of mind are projected onto 
organizational behaviors. This is primarily due to the ongoing disagreement and 
debate on the workings of the mind in the neuropsychological source domain; in 
particular between those championing a computational connectionist or associative 
model of the mind (see, e.g. Rumelhart and McClelland 1986) as opposed to a 
neuropsychological view that considers the mind as a combinatorial architecture (see, 
e.g. Dupuy 2000).  
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Metaphorical blending processes are not unconstrained, and the eight 
optimality principles embody the constraints under which blends work most 
effectively. We suggest that these principles are important determinants of the aptness 
of a metaphor, and, as a corollary, of whether a metaphorical image resonates with 
organizational researchers and is subsequently selected for theorizing and research. In 
general, we suggest that metaphorical blends may be selective in the optimality 
principles that they satisfy, and that the most apt metaphors are the ones that satisfy 
multiple principles rather than a single one. Metaphors for organizations that satisfy 
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few if any of these principles (e.g. the metaphorical image of organization as soap 
bubbles) (Tsoukas 1993) fail to be apt. Such metaphors in turn are theoretically 
deficient and have a limited capacity to generate intelligible theoretical insights and 
research pathways. 
The optimality principles, then, are important within disciplined 
imagination in providing criteria at the level of thought trials for considering whether 
a metaphorical image is apt; that is, fitting and meaningful. Inasfar as these principles 
can be used in a fully conscious and explicit way (rather than as post hoc motivated 
explanations of the development and selection of metaphorical images) we suggest 
that researchers would be wise to use them. This means that in the process of 
metaphorical variation within the different thought trials, researchers consciously 
assess whether a metaphor connects a target concept with a source that is concrete, 
relational and distant and that includes a representation with different relations and 
elements which can be unpacked (i.e. interpreted and elaborated in different ways) 
and integrated with it. Although the optimality principles should not be used to 
strictly guide and limit the process of metaphorical variation, they can we feel be used 
within the thought trials to assess the aptness of any one image that is generated.  
The maxim of satisfying multiple principles as a tactic or heuristic arguably 
enhances a researchers odds and increases the payoff from theorizing. Metaphors that 
satisfy multiple principles, rather than a single one, provide for rich images that can 
be elaborated and instantiated in many different ways and with rich detail. As such, 
organizational metaphors of the type of (open-)systems, organism, machine and 
evolution fare better than ones that consider organizations as, for example, seesaws, 
octopoids, garbage cans or soap bubbles. Figure 1 illustrates the role of the 
optimality principles within thought trails undertaken as part of disciplined 
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imagination and with reference to the organizational improvisation as jazz 
metaphor. Starting with the problem statement (How can we understand the nature 
and process of organizational improvisation?), the individual researcher going 
through this theorizing process was able to imagine different metaphorical images 
(jazz, orchestras, sports teams, etc.) for the subject (see Kamoche et al., 2003) which 
were all apt to varying degrees (although arguably the jazz metaphor, unlike the other 
two, is relatively more apt in its satisfaction of the integration principle which is 
closely connected to the composition of minimal structures within both jazz and 
organizational improvisation), and then had to make a selection between them. The 
jazz metaphor was chosen because it is arguably relatively more apt than the other 
imagined metaphors and also met Weicks (1989: 525-528) selection criteria (i.e. 
metaphorical representations  are selected on the basis of their enlightening potential 
(thats interesting), their simplicity and obviousness (thats obvious), their 
relational extension and grounding (thats connected), their plausibility and 
coherence (thats believable), their aesthetics (thats beautiful), and their 
referential or real nature (thats real)) making it a plausible image for theorizing and 
research. 
  
------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 around here 
------------------------------- 
 
We suggest following Weick that the stages of variation and selection are 
closely related, and more interconnected, iterative and simultaneous than sequential. 
We also believe that the aptness of a metaphor, which is predetermined by the 
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optimality principles, is closely related to its plausibility and subsequent selection. 
The selection and retention of a metaphor within disciplined imagination, then, is a 
result of the degree to which a metaphorical representation is established as apt in 
the thought trails and subsequently selected as a plausible theoretical representation. 
Figure 1 illustrates this process for the example of organizational improvisation as 
jazz; noting the principles and selection criteria that were satisfied by this particular 
metaphor (in italics) as a basis for its selection and retention in organizational 
theorizing and research. 
The important contribution, then, to the framework of disciplined 
imagination is that the optimality principles add to the process of metaphorical 
variation within the thought trials and to the selection of metaphorical representations 
as embodied by Weicks original six criteria. Although it may be argued that the 
optimality principles and Weicks selection criteria are closely related (for example, 
the topology principle and thats connected or the integration principle and thats 
obvious), we believe that these principles and selection criteria refer to different 
stages within disciplined imagination, i.e. variation versus selection, and involve 
very different assessments of aptness (the richness and meaningfulness of a 
metaphorical image in and of itself) versus plausibility (the plausibility and currency 
of a metaphor as theoretical representation for extended theorizing and research). 
Better theorizing, we may now suggest, involves the development, selection and 
retention of metaphors and metaphorical representations that satisfy a multitude of the 
eight optimality principles. Conversely, metaphors that fail to do so (and satisfy 
only one or a few principles) are theoretically deficient in that they are insufficiently 
apt and may fail to generate novel, creative and intelligible theoretical insights and 
research pathways. The metaphorical image of an organization as soap bubbles 
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(Tsoukas 1993), for example, satisfies the distance principle but none of the other 
principles. On that basis, although the metaphor is creative it is not sufficiently 
meaningful or apt and also insufficiently plausible in the sense of being potentially 
insightful of the structure, processes and functions of organizations (Weick, 1989). 
Having made the process of metaphorical imagination more explicit, it now 
becomes clearer that theory construction can be modified, and therefore improved, not 
only at the stage where the problem is stated and the target subject is circumscribed, 
but also at the step where thought trials are formulated and metaphorical images are 
constructed (using the optimality principles) as well as at the step where criteria 
select among the various thought trials and images produced (Weick 1989).  
 On the whole, the theoretical outline of metaphorical imagination as 
conceptual blending at the same time grounds and augments the framework of 
disciplined imagination in specifying the non-compositional processes 
(composition, completion, and elaboration) by which thought trials take place and 
metaphorical images become produced, and in explicating the constraints under 
which metaphorical blends are most effective. Previous work on disciplined 
imagination, including Weicks own writings (e.g. Weick 1989, 1995a, 1999a,b), has 
emphasized the importance of metaphorical imagination and has characterized the 
process of theory construction as involving mental simulation (Folger and Turillo 
1999) and imaginary experimentation (Weick 1989). In our analysis, this simulation 
capacity exists in the on-line elaboration of a metaphorical blend (running the 
blend). The contribution of the CB framework of metaphor, then, is that it specifies 
and formalizes how such imaginary simulation or experimentation takes place and, 
indeed, can be better guided. 
 Metaphorical blending, as we have shown, is not a compositional algorithmic 
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process and cannot be modeled as such for even the most rudimentary metaphors. 
Blends are not predictable solely from the structure of the inputs. Rather, they are 
highly motivated by such structure, in harmony with independently available 
background information and contextual structure; and in compliance with the 
optimality constraints discussed above (e.g. Coulson 2001; Fauconnier and Turner 
1998). In this regard, the most suitable analog for the use of metaphors, and for the 
blending processes involved in their comprehension, is not chemical composition but 
biological evolution  an insight shared by such writers as Campbell (1960), Koestler 
(1964), and, indeed, Weick (1989). 
In a more practical sense, our overview of the processes and constraints of 
conceptual blending that underlie disciplined imagination may provide reference 
points to organizational researchers for a more directed use of metaphorical 
imagination, with the optimality principles featuring as useful criteria to assess the 
aptness of a metaphorical image. Thus, rather than settling for metaphorical 
comparisons that are simply available or, indeed, offer mere appearance matches 
(Tsoukas 1993), the optimality principles may aid organizational researchers to 
probe further and create apt and meaningful metaphorical images. To build better 
theory, Weick (1989: 529) argued, theorists have to think better, by which he 
meant that organizational researchers need to use the process of disciplined 
imagination in a more deliberate and informed way.  
There may not be simple prescriptions about the one best way to theorize 
(Weick 1989, 1995a, 1999b, 2004), but clearly not all tactics equally enhance a 
researchers odds. Our recommendation is to use the optimality principles and the 
related criterion of aptness within disciplined imagination as a tactic or heuristic to 
increase the payoff from theorizing. Better theory involves the development and 
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selection of metaphors that not only satisfy multiple optimality principles and are 
apt, but that are also plausible conceptual vehicles for the development of 
frameworks, constructs and propositions for research. Armed with this augmented 
understanding of disciplined imagination researchers, we hope, will be able to 
harness the productive potential of metaphorical imagination and advance and 
strengthen theory development within the field.  
 28
REFERENCES 
Anderson, John R. 
1976 Language, memory, and thought. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Baars, Bernard J.  
1997 In the theatre of consciousness: The workspace of the mind. Oxford: OUP. 
 
Bastien, David T., and Todd J. Hostager 
1988 Jazz as a process of organizational innovation. Communication Research 15: 
582-602. 
 
Baum, Joel A.C. and Tim J. Rowley 
2002 Organizations: An introduction in Companion to organizations, Joel A.C. 
Baum, (ed.), 1-34. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Campbell, Donald T. 
1960 Blind variation and selective retention in creative thought as in other 
knowledge processes. Psychological Review 67: 380-400.  
 
Coulson, Seana 
2001 Semantic leaps: Frame-shifting and conceptual blending in meaning 
construction Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Coulson, Seana and Todd Oakley 
2000 Blending basics. Cognitive Linguistics 11: 175-196. 
 
Cornelissen, Joep P. 
2004 What are we playing at? Theatre, organization and the use of metaphor. 
Organization Studies 25: 705-726. 
 
Cornelissen, Joep P. 
2005 Beyond compare: Metaphor in organization theory. Academy of Management 
Review 30: 751-764. 
 
Daft, Richard L., and Arie Y. Lewin 
1990 Can organizational studies begin to break out of the normal science 
straitjacket? An editorial essay. Organization Science 1: 1-9. 
 
Daft, Richard L., and Karl E. Weick 
1984 Toward a model of organizations as interpretation systems. Academy of 
Management Review 9: 284-295. 
 
Danziger, Kurt 
1990 Generative metaphor and the history of psychological discourse in Metaphor 
in the history of psychology, D.E. Leary (ed.), 331-356. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Draaisma, Douwe  
 29
2000 Metaphors of memory: A history of ideas about the mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dupuy, Jean-Pierre 
2000 The mechanization of the mind: On the origins of cognitive science. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Fauconnier, Gilles, and Mark Turner 
1998 Conceptual integration networks. Cognitive Science, 22: 133-187. 
 
Fauconnier, Gilles, and Mark Turner 
2002 The way we think. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Folger, Robert, and Carmelo J. Turillo  
1999 Theorizing as the thickness of thin abstraction. Academy of Management 
Review 24: 742-758. 
 
Garud, Raghu and Suresh Kotha 
1994 Using the brain as a metaphor to model flexible production systems. Academy 
of Management Review 19: 671-698. 
 
Gentner, Derdre and Catherine Clement 
1988 Evidence for relational selectivity in interpreting analogy and metaphor in The 
Psychology of learning and motivation, G.H. Bower (ed.), 307-358. New York: 
Academic Press. 
 
Gibbs, Raymond W. Jr. 
1996 Why many concepts are metaphorical. Cognition, 61: 309-319. 
 
Goffman, Erving  
1959 The presentation of self in everyday life. New York: Doubleday. 
 
Grant, David, and Cliff Oswick (eds.) 
1996 Metaphor and organizations. London: Sage.  
 
Hofstadter, Douglas and the Fluid Analogies Research Group 
1995 Fluid concepts and creative analogies. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Johnson, Mark 
1987 The Body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kamoche, Ken, and Miguel P. Cunha 
2001 Minimal structures: From jazz improvisation to product innovation. 
Organization Studies 22: 733-764. 
 
Kamoche, Ken, Miguel P. Cunha, and Joao V. Cunha 
2003 Towards a theory of organizational improvisation: Looking beyond the jazz 
metaphor. Journal of Management Studies 40: 2023-2051. 
 30
 Katz, Albert N. 
1989 On choosing the vehicles of metaphors: Referential concreteness, semantic 
distances, and individual differences. Journal of Memory and Language, 28: 486-
499. 
 
Katz, Albert N.  
1992 Psychological studies in metaphor processing: Extensions to the placement of 
terms in semantic space. Poetics Today 13: 607-632. 
 
Koestler, Arthur 
1964 The act of creation. London: Arkana/Penguin (reprint 1989). 
 
Lakoff, George  
1993 The contemporary theory of metaphor in Metaphor and thought. Andrew 
Ortony (ed.), 202-251. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, second edition. 
 
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson 
1980 Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Mangham, Iain L., and Michael A. Overington  
1987 Organizations as theatre: A social psychology of dramatic appearances. 
Chicester: Wiley. 
 
MacCormac, Earl R. 
1986 Creative metaphors. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 1: 171-184. 
 
Morgan, Gareth  
1980 Paradigms, metaphors and puzzle solving in organizational theory. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 25: 605-622. 
 
Morgan, Gareth 
1983 More on metaphor: why we cannot control tropes in administrative science. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 28: 601-607. 
 
Morgan, Gareth 
1996 Is there anything more to be said about metaphor? in Metaphor and 
organizations. D. Grant and C. Oswick (eds.), 227-240. London: Sage. 
 
Oakley, Todd 
1998 Conceptual blending, narrative discourse, and rhetoric. Cognitive Linguistics 
9: 320-360. 
 
Orlikowski, Wanda J. 
2002 Knowing in practice: Enacting a collective capability in distributed organizing. 
Organization Science 12: 249-74. 
 
Pinder, Craig, and Warren V. Bourgeois 
1982 Controlling tropes in administrative science. Administrative Science Quarterly 
27: 641-652. 
 31
 Putnam, Linda and Suzanne Boys 
2006 Revisiting metaphors of organizational communication in The Sage handbook 
of organization studies. Stewart R. Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, Thomas B. Lawrence and 
Walter R. Nord (eds.). London: Sage. 
 
Putnam, Linda, Nelson Phillips, and Pamela Chapman 
1996 Metaphors of communication and organization in Handbook of organization 
studies, Stewart Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, and Walter Nord (eds.), 375-408. London: 
Sage. 
 
Rumelhart, David E., and James L. McClelland 
1986 Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition 
(vols. 1 and 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Sandelands, Lloyd E. and Ralph E. Stablein 
1987 The concept of organization mind in Research in the sociology of 
organizations. S. Bacharach and N. DiTomaso (eds.), 135-161. Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press. 
 
Simon, Herbert A. 
1973 Does scientific discovery have a logic?. Philosophy of Science 40: 471-480. 
 
Taylor, James R., and Francois Cooren 
1997 What makes communication organizational?. Journal of Pragmatics 27: 409-
438 
 
Tourangeau, Roger, and Lance Rips 
1991 Interpreting and evaluating metaphors. Journal of Memory and Language 30: 
452-472. 
 
Tsoukas, Haridimos  
1991 The missing link: A transformational view of metaphors in organizational 
science. Academy of Management Review 16: 566-585. 
 
Tsoukas, Haridimos  
1993 Analogical reasoning and knowledge generation in organization theory. 
Organization Studies 14: 323-346. 
 
Tsoukas, Haridimos  
1996 The firm as distributed knowledge system: A constructionist approach. 
Strategic Management Journal 7: 11-25. 
 
Weick, Karl E. 
1979 The social psychology of organizing. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, second 
edition. 
 
Weick, Karl E.  
1989 Theory construction as disciplined imagination. Academy of Management 
 32
Review 14: 516-531. 
 
Weick, Karl E. 
1993 The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38: 628-652. 
 
Weick, Karl E. 
1995a What theory is not, theorizing is. Administrative Science Quarterly 40: 385-
390. 
 
Weick, Karl E. 
1995b Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Weick, Karl E. 
1998 Improvisation as a mindset for organizational analysis. Organization Science, 
9: 54355. 
 
Weick, Karl E. 
1999a The aesthetic of imperfection in orchestras and organizations. 
Comportamento Organizacional e Gestão 5: 5-22. 
 
Weick, Karl E. 
1999b Theory construction as disciplined reflexivity: Tradeoffs in the 90s. Academy 
of Management Review 24: 797-806. 
 
Weick, Karl E. 
2004 Mundane poetics: Searching for wisdom in organization studies. Organization 
Studies 25: 653-668. 
 
Weick, Karl E. and Richard L. Daft 
1983 The effectiveness of interpretation systems in Organizational effectiveness: A 
comparison of multiple models. Kim S. Cameron and David A. Whetten (eds.), 71-93. 
New York, NY: Academic Press. 
 
Weick, Karl E., and Karlene H. Roberts  
1993 Collective mind in organizations: Heedful interrelating on flight decks. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38: 357-382. 
 
 33
Table 1: The Optimality Principles of Metaphorical Imagination 
 
Principle Definition Organizational 
improvisation as 
jazz 
Organizational 
behavior as 
collective mind 
Integration principle That representations in the 
metaphorical blend can be manipulated 
as a single unit 
Satisfied Satisfied 
Topology principle That relations in the metaphorical 
blend should match the relations of 
their counterparts in other semantic 
domains 
Satisfied Satisfied 
Web principle That the representation in the 
metaphorical blend should maintain a 
relationship to the input target and 
source concepts 
Satisfied Satisfied 
Unpacking principle That, given a metaphorical blend, the 
interpreter should be able to infer the 
structure in relation to other subjects 
and applications 
Satisfied Satisfied 
Good reason principle That creates pressure to attribute 
significance to elements in the 
metaphorical blend 
Satisfied Satisfied 
Metonymic tightening 
principle 
That when metonymically related 
elements are projected into the 
metaphorical blend, there is pressure 
to compress the distance between 
them 
Satisfied Satisfied 
Distance principle That the target and source concepts 
need to come  from semantically 
distant semantic domains 
Not (fully) satisfied Satisfied 
Concreteness principle That the source concept compared to 
the target is sufficiently concrete 
(rather than abstract) to be understood 
and manipulated. 
Satisfied Not (fully) satisfied 
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Figure 1: Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination: The ‘Organizational 
Improvisation as Jazz’ Metaphor 
 
 Problem Statement Thought Trials (variation)  Selection  
       
 How can we 
understand the 
nature and process 
of organizational 
improvisation? 
 
ļ 
Organizational 
improvisation  
as Jazz 
Orchestras 
Sports teams 
 
 
ļ 
Organizational 
improvisation as 
Jazz 
 
       
   Optimality principles  Selection criteria  
   Integration principle  That’s interesting  
   Web principle  That’s obvious  
   Unpacking principle  That’s connected  
   Good reason principle  That’s believable   
   Metonymic tightening principle  That’s beautiful  
   Distance principle  That’s real  
   Concreteness principle    
       
 
Note: principles and selection criteria satisfied by the organizational improvisation as jazz metaphor 
are in italics 
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